47집 발행일:2018.06
  • 베트남 전쟁 시기 미국 외교정책, 1954-196
  • American Foreign Policy of the Vietnam War, 1954-1968
  • 장준갑
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목차

I. 들어가는 말
II. 미국 개입의 배경(1954-1960)
III. 미국 개입의 실체: 무능한 메시아(1961-1968)
IV. 나가며

초록

The paper examines how and why American politicians made decisions on Vietnam War from 1954 to 1968 during which American interventions had reached the highest level. It also discussed the reason why Americans could not achieve their goals in Vietnam even though they had mobilized huge amounts of manpower and ammunitions to win the war. Such discussions enables us to understand multidimensional structure of the war and to point out American behavior went far beyond simple anti-communist movements or military dominance in the region: the Messiah to save the world.
The reason that Americans took such a hard lines including military warfare and ideological battlefield in the region was based on domino theory in which if America lost Vietnam it would send a message of weakness and give the Communists staging grounds for further forward thrust. America was conceived with a sense of mission and dedicated to the extension of freedom throughout the world. Americans also thought that abandoning Vietnam would produce a fundamental threat to the security of the United States.
Americanization of the Vietnam War reflected those ideas that aggression must not be allowed to succeed lest the Free World’s integrity be undermined. It was better to draw the line in a place like Vietnam than have to fight close to home and for bigger stakes. America, however, could not succeed to achieve its goal because of it miscalculation on its ability and enemy’s iron will not to be defeated by foreign invaders such as the United States which supported an old imperialism of Europe. The messianic mission of Americans could never have been achieved by such negative behaviors as supporting dictatorships, infiltrations, and military adventures in Vietnam